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One Person, One Vote: Gerrymandering and the
Independent Commission, A Global Perspective
JAMES RULEY*
In 1863, on the hallowed fields at Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln encapsulated a core
principle of democracy by describing our system as a “government of the people, by
the people, [and] for the people.”1 This definition accurately depicts the ideal of democracy—that supreme power is vested in the citizenry, not in the government itself.
Since the American model is based on representative democracy instead of direct
democracy,2 extreme scrutiny must be placed upon the system of choosing representatives if government is to accurately represent the will of the people.
One of the greatest abuses of a citizen’s voting rights is gerrymandering. While
scholars have written extensively advocating the need for restraints on legislative
abuses of the redistricting process, little has been written about gerrymandering from
an international perspective. 3 This Note seeks to bridge that gap. Part I of this Note
provides more context on the history and dangers of gerrymandering. Part II examines the state of redistricting commissions within the United States. Part III examines
global practices for independent commissions. Finally, this Note concludes by
recommending practices that could be implemented in the United States.4
I. GERRYMANDERING AND REDISTRICTING: AN OVERVIEW
The boundary lines that define voting districts provide an essential framework in
a representative democracy. In the United States, each district elects one individual
to serve as its representative in the legislature. The state legislature draws districts
based on the results of a national census, conducted every ten years. 5 Problems arose,
however, as states refused to redraw boundary lines in response to changes in the
population of each district, resulting in some districts having many more constituents

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2014, Bob
Jones University. My deepest thanks to Professor David Williams—without his advice, insight, and passion this Note topic would not have been conceived of, let alone written. Also,
thanks to my wife, Courtney, for her love, support, and patience throughout the (at times)
tedious Note-writing process.
1. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, November 19, 1863, in
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 1859–1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (the text of the
Gettysburg Address).
2. BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DEMOCRACY IN BRIEF 5–7,
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/amgov/30145/publications-english/democracy-in-brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H8GU-WYYS].
3. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121
YALE L.J. 1808 (2012); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 769 (2013) (looking briefly at global alternatives but mostly focusing on
American redistricting solutions); Ryan P. Bates, Note, Congressional Authority To Require
State Adoption of Independent Redistricting Commissions, 55 DUKE L.J. 333 (2005).
4. See infra Conclusion.
5. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 (establishing the decennial census).
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than other districts.6 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that failing to update boundary lines in response to changing population numbers violates the Equal
Protection Clause, which guarantees that each person’s vote will be counted equally. 7
This principle has been encapsulated by the phrase “one person, one vote.”8 In effect,
following Reynolds, states must draw electoral districts in a way that ensures that a
roughly proportional number of citizens are contained in each district. 9
However, Reynolds has done little to counter another problem endemic to the
district-drawing process: gerrymandering. 10 The process of gerrymandering involves
“dividing political units in ways that deliberately create advantages for incumbents
or their political allies, by placing voters based on their predicted behavior at the
polls in districts that dilute the vote of some voters and consolidate the votes of
others.”11
To add some clarity to that definition, imagine four districts, W, X, Y, and Z.
Districts W, X, and Y each have nine members from the Pink Party and one member
from the Orange Party. District Z has three members from the Pink Party and seven
members from the Orange Party. Thus, before redistricting, the Pink Party will have
three seats in the legislature and the Orange Party will have one. This is a fair result,
since the Pink Party has thirty supporters (or seventy-five percent of the vote) and
the Orange Party has ten supporters (or twenty-five percent of the vote). However,
because the Pink Party controls the legislature, it could redraw the districting map,

6. The Court found this to be the case in Reynolds v. Sims, finding that the Alabama state
legislature specifically, and presumptively other states as well, had not properly redistricted
for over sixty years. 377 U.S. 533, 568–70 (1964).
7. The Court applied this standard to both the upper house and the lower house in states
with bicameral legislatures. Id. It is useful to note that the district-drawing process does not
apply to those elected to the U.S. Senate, as they are elected by the popular vote of all citizens
of a state. For an argument that U.S. Senators should be elected on the basis of state districts
like members of the House of Representatives, see Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty
of the People: The Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1996). It is also an interesting
practical note that the U.S. Senate, by design, violates the principle of one person, one vote,
since California (population 37,254,503) and Wyoming (population 563,736) each have two
representatives. California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table
/PST045215/06 [https://perma.cc/BTS5-L9R8] (2010 census data); Wyoming, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/56 [https://perma.cc/UB6B-TQ5L]
(2010 Census data). This violation of (or exception to) the one-person, one-vote principle is
supported by the formulation of the Senate in Article I of the Constitution and by the
Seventeenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. amend. XVII.
8. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)). This
principle has also been encapsulated in the word “equipopulous,” simply meaning equally
populated. See Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The
Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1333 n.14 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing
for the first time the principle of one person, one vote); see also Harvard Law Review
Association, Congressional Redistricting, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1, 135 (1983).
10. “The term ‘gerrymander’ is a portmanteau of the last name of Elbridge Gerry, the
eighth governor of Massachusetts, and the shape of the electoral map he famously contorted
for partisan gain, which included one district shaped like a salamander.” Ariz. State
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 n.1 (2015).
11. Gerrymandering, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Stephen Michael Sheppard ed., 2012).
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spreading its supporters more evenly among the four districts so as to gain complete
control of the legislature. Thus, the redrawn districting map might have seven or
eight Pink Party supporters in each district and only two or three Orange Party supporters. The Pink Party would still only have seventy-five percent of the people
supporting it, but it could capture one hundred percent of the legislature.12
Political gerrymandering is dangerous for a number of reasons. First, gerrymandering may create districts that are confusing in size and shape, leading to misunderstandings of where constituents are to vote.13 Second, gerrymandering encourages elections to be more polarizing; if the legislature gerrymanders districts
according to ideology, then politicians are forced to run on platforms that are ideologically similar to the constituents placed in those districts.14 Finally, the fact that a
vast majority of these district elections are predetermined by gerrymanders often removes real voter choice in the election and furthermore is likely to result in voter
apathy.15
Although a plurality of the Supreme Court determined in Vieth v. Jubelirer that
“[p]artisan gerrymanders . . . [are incompatible] with democratic principles,”16 the
Court has, as of yet, refused to find gerrymandering justiciable.17 The Court cited the
difficulty in finding a workable standard as its reason for refusing to delve into the
political thicket surrounding partisan gerrymanders.18
States have responded to the problems created by gerrymanders in divergent
ways, ranging from altering the balance of legislative votes needed to confirm district
lines;19 to requiring judicial oversight of districting lines; 20 to creating advisory commissions,21 backup commissions,22 politician commissions,23 and independent

12. This example is based on class notes and personal discussions with Professor David
Williams. Unpublished materials on file with the Indiana Law Journal. See also Christopher
Ingraham, This Is the Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You Will Ever See, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/01
/this-is-the-best-explanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-ever-see/ [https://perma.cc/Z25W-UVF9].
13. Nathan S. Catanese, Note, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 NOTRE DAME. J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 338–39 (2014).
14. Id. at 339–40.
15. Id. at 340–41.
16. Ariz. State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2658 (2015) (last bracketed alteration in original) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,
292 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
17. Justice Kennedy, in a concurrence, failed to find a workable standard but seemed to
remain open to the possibility of hearing matters in the future. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306–17
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. Id. at 317–68 (dissenting opinions). While the Court has heard two other cases on the
matter in recent years, it has still failed to elucidate a clear standard for hearing cases, although
theoretically a standard might exist. Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012); League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
18. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part II.C.

786

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:783

commissions.24 As this Note will examine in Part II, these commissions have had
varying degrees of success in blunting the problems created by partisan
gerrymanders.25
II. THE ROLE OF REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The vast majority of states have not aggressively combatted the problems presented by gerrymandering.26 In those that have, reforms have occurred in three ways.
The first type of reform alters the legislative balance of power, primarily by requiring
a supermajority for action, so that the majority party will not dominate the redistricting process.27 The second type of reform creates supplemental commissions to either
recommend boundary changes to the legislature or resolve boundary conflicts when
the legislature is unable to reach a solution.28 The third type of reform creates a commission to draw boundaries independent of legislative control.29 Many states have
adopted a conglomeration of these reforms; so, for instance, some states may have
enacted both legislative reforms and a supplemental commission.
A. Legislative Reform
States have employed several different methods of legislative reform to ensure
that lines are drawn fairly. The first method, utilized by Connecticut and Maine, requires the legislature to approve redistricting plans by a two-thirds majority vote.30
The primary benefit of this plan is that, since it is incredibly difficult for a party to
gain control of two-thirds of the legislature, it becomes much more difficult for one
party to draw the district lines in its favor, thereby skewing the results of elections in
the majority party’s favor.
However, there are two downsides with this approach. First, it requires the legislature to compromise and come to a consensus, often a difficult process that could
potentially lead to gridlock.31 Second, if one party does manage to gain two-thirds of
the legislature, a difficult, but not inconceivable, outcome, then that party would still
be able to manipulate the lines. This problem is compounded by the difficulty the
legislature already faces fixing bad plans: even if a majority party becomes a legislative minority, the minority party cannot adjust the plan unless it achieves a twothirds majority. In effect, this almost ensures that if a party has a two-thirds majority,

24. See infra Part II.C.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See Cain, supra note 3, at 1844 (noting that in the vast majority of states, legislatures
still control the redistricting process); Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT
REDISTRICTING (2015), http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php [https://perma.cc/X755-Z7XQ].
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra Part II.C.
30. CONN. CONST. art. XXX; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 1206(1) (Supp. 2015).
31. This difficulty in getting these plans approved by a two-thirds majority is one of the
primary reasons that many of these states have a backup commission, as discussed below. An
additional concern is that legislators often oppose plans because it will make it harder for them
to be reelected.
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its plan will be nearly impossible to modify until the next census when the lines could
be redrawn.
The second method used by states to check legislative districting power grants the
state’s highest court explicit power to become involved with districting disputes.
Some states give the state supreme court the explicit power to review redistricting
plans if they are challenged.32 This explicit grant of power is particularly significant
in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s struggle to determine whether the issue of gerrymandering is justiciable; while the Supreme Court has been slow to review these
cases, several states are encouraging judicial review to ensure that plans are impartial.33 Other states mandate that the state supreme court create a districting plan if
the legislature is unable to reach a consensus.34 While this approach may create questions of judicial economy, it at least provides an alternative to gridlock and provides
an incentive for the legislature to formulate a plan. An additional concern is whether
granting the judiciary power over redistricting plans will result in a more balanced
outcome, particularly if the members of the state supreme court share a political ideology with the state legislators. This could be especially troubling if the bench were
ideologically skewed and the justices had life tenure. While there are concerns over
the impartiality of the judiciary,35 the judiciary would still perhaps be better suited to
this task than legislators who would stand to reap immediate political rewards from
their district drawing.

32. These states include Colorado, COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(e); Connecticut, CONN.
CONST. art. XXVI(d); Iowa, IOWA CONST. art. III, § 36; Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1206(2)–(3) (Supp. 2015); Florida, FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c) (requiring the attorney
general to petition the supreme court to enter declaratory judgment as to the validity of the
state—but not congressional—redistricting plan); Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 10;
Maryland, MD. CONST. art. III, § 5 (enabling review by the state’s highest court to review state
district lines); North Carolina, N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-267.1 (West Supp. 2016) (requiring challenges to be heard by a three judge panel composed of judges from different parts of the state);
Ohio, OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 9 (allowing state plans to be challenged under the jurisdiction of
the state supreme court; if struck down, a new plan may be made by the politician commission), Oklahoma, OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11C; Oregon, OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2); and
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1909 (2015).
33. See supra note 3.
34. These states include Connecticut, CONN. CONST. art. XXVI(d); Maine, ME REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206(2)–(3) (Supp. 2015); Florida, FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(b) (requiring
the attorney general to petition the state supreme court to adopt a plan if the legislature fails to
do so); and Missouri, MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7.
35. A concern here with tenure is that justices who serve for life might consistently pass
skewed plans, while the legislature might fluctuate more dramatically due to the short term
length. For information about judicial impartiality, see, for example, Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex
R. Perschbacher, Perceptions of Justice: An International Perspective on Judges and Appearances, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 136 (2013) (emphasizing the need for judicial independence,
in addition to the major problem with judicial independence, recusal); Charles Gardner Geyh,
The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493 (2014) (emphasizing the many
facets behind our conception of judicial independence).
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B. Supplemental Commissions
Several states have adopted supplemental commissions designed to help their
legislatures make informed decisions as to how boundary lines should be drawn between districts. These supplemental commissions fall into two major categories: advisory commissions organized to help the legislature make informed redistricting
decisions and backup commissions designed to step in and create a redistricting plan
if the legislature fails to do so.
Currently, eight states utilize advisory commissions for redistricting commissions.36 While these commissions have no authority to draw lines, their recommendations can have significant weight on the redistricting decisions of the legislature.37
Further, members of these commissions are generally nonlegislators, so in theory
they provide objective, apolitical advice on the boundary-drawing process. Yet,
advisory commissions only serve as a partial solution to gerrymanders because the

36. In Iowa, the advisory commission is formed from the legislative services agency
(LSA). The LSA is composed of nonpartisan members who draft districting plans from criteria
clearly delineated by statute. IOWA CODE ANN. § 2A.1 (West 2012). This input comes from a
five-member independent commission, two members of which are appointed by the congressional leaders from the majority and minority parties. The final member is chosen by consensus of the four other members. The commission can propose three plans to the legislature. The
first two must be approved or rejected without modification; the third plan may be approved
with modifications. Id. at §§ 42.3, .5, .6. In Maine, the advisory commission is staffed by
fifteen members, chosen equally by both parties with the final member chosen by commissioners. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1-A. Decisions of the commission may be adopted, modified, or ignored by the legislature. ID. § 3; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206. In New
York, plans are proposed by a six-member commission, some of whom are political and some
of whom are not. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m (McKinney, Westlaw through 2016 legislation).
The legislature may adopt, modify, or ignore proposals. Id. In Ohio, a six-member advisory
committee is appointed by the state House and Senate majority leaders; two must be from
opposing parties, and two must not be legislators. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.51 (LexisNexis
2014). The findings of the advisory committee are only used for recommendation purposes.
Id. In Rhode Island, an eighteen-member commission consisting of legislative and nonlegislative members provides assistance in developing districting plans and also “issue[s] an
annual report” to state officials. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-9.1-31(a) (2016). In Vermont, a sevenmember commission is composed of nonlegislative members chosen by the governor, the chief
justice, and parties’ state committee chairs. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1904 (2015). The
Legislature may adopt, modify, or ignore proposals. Id. In Virginia, an eleven-member commission is formed from five members from each major party and one commissioner who is to
be not associated with any party. ROBERT F. MCDONNELL, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
COMMONWEALTH OF VA., EXEC. ORDER NO. 31, ESTABLISHING THE INDEPENDENT BIPARTISAN
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REDISTRICTING (2011). The legislature may adopt, modify, or ignore proposals. Id.
37. See supra note 36. The weight varies state to state. A good example of an advisory
commission holding substantial weight is Iowa. The commission can present two plans for
approval that must receive an up or down vote before a plan may be approved with modifications. Edith Munro, Gerrymandering? Not in Iowa, TIMES UNION (Apr. 14, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Gerrymandering-Not-in-Iowa-1336319.php [https://
perma.cc/6UE2-AKSQ]. The time required to prepare these plans, and the effort required to
vote down two of them, seems to provide a good check on arbitrary modifications. Id.
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legislature can accept or ignore the commission’s recommendations, giving it influence only relative to the respect the legislature has for its opinions.
A second type of supplemental commission is the backup commission. These bodies are designed to serve as a failsafe if the legislature is unable to approve a redistricting plan. Backup plans vary greatly from state to state, including using the
governor’s preferred plan,38 using the secretary of state’s preferred plan,39 delegating
the authority to specific legislative actors, 40 delegating the authority to specific nonlegislative elected officials,41 or a mixture of these approaches.42 The greatest benefits of an approach that incorporates a backup commission are that these commissions
serve both as an incentive for the legislature to reach consensus and as a means of
ensuring that the redistricting process does not end in gridlock.
C. Independent Commissions
The final method states have used to combat gerrymanders is the independent
commission. States using independent commissions delegate redistricting to a body
other than the legislature as a whole. Unlike advisory commissions, these bodies have
the power to determine boundary lines, not merely to make suggestions to the legislature. Currently, there are two types of independent commissions: the politician
commission and the (truly) independent commission.
Seven states currently use politician commissions to determine state district
boundaries, and two of those states also use those commissions to determine federal
congressional districts.43 Politician commissions are, in a very real sense, independent—these commissions are composed of elected officials who approve a

38. In Maryland, if the legislature fails to approve a plan, the governor’s plan becomes
law. MD. CONST. art. III, § 5.
39. In Oregon, if the legislature fails to approve a plan, the secretary of state has the authority to draw district lines. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6(3)(a).
40. In Connecticut and Illinois, commissioners are chosen by legislative leadership.
CONN. CONST. art. XXVI(b); ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Indiana provides a unique twist on this
formula. While legislative leadership chooses some candidates, the Governor chooses one additional commissioner. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (West 2006).
41. In Mississippi, a commission composed of the chief justice, attorney general, secretary of state, and the majority leaders of the House and Senate draws the lines. MISS. CONST.
art. XIII, § 254. In Texas, the backup commission is staffed by the lieutenant governor, the
Speaker of the House, the attorney general, the comptroller, and the commissioner of the
General Land Office. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.
42. In Oklahoma, a citizen initiative passed in 2010 created a seven-member backup commission staffed by the lieutenant governor (nonvoting chair), three Republicans, and three
Democrats. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A. The governor, state House majority leader, and state
Senate majority leader each gets to choose one Republican and one Democrat for the commission. Id.
43. These seven states include Arkansas, ARK. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (requiring the governor,
secretary of state, and attorney general to serve on the commission); Colorado, COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 48 (requiring the appointment of an eleven-member commission chosen by majority
and minority leaders, the governor, and the chief justice); Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2
(requiring a nine-member commission, four members chosen each by majority and minority
leaders with the tiebreaker chosen by the eight commissioners; Hawaii’s commission draws
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redistricting plan completely separate from the legislature. A useful role is served by
these commissions because they often seek to balance the political affiliation of commissioners to achieve a more representational result.44 However, if improperly constructed, these commissions can fall into the same pitfalls as legislative redistricting
due to the political incentives inherently attached to the job.45
Six states currently utilize independent commissions, which means that members
are not allowed to simultaneously serve in the legislature.46 The idea behind these
commissions is that since legislators are inherently biased in favor of themselves and
their parties, the task of line drawing must be delegated to a neutral body. 47 Usually,
the majority of commissioners are chosen equally by the state political parties, with
the deciding vote delegated to a member chosen by the other commissioners or by
some other criteria.48

lines for state and congressional districts); Missouri, MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7 (requiring
two commissions, appointed respectively by the House and Senate, with some members chosen by the governor); New Jersey, N.J CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 1 (requiring a thirteen-member
politician commission for drawing congressional lines; twelve members to be chosen by the
majority/minority and party leaders, the deciding member to be chosen by the commissioners);
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (requiring a ten- or eleven-member commission for state districting
lines; parties appoint an equal number of members; if they cannot approve a plan, the chief
justice appoints a tiebreaker); Ohio, OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1 (requiring a seven-member politician commission staffed by the governor, state auditor, secretary of state, one appointee from
the Speaker of the House, one appointee from the president of the senate, and one commissioner each from the minority leaders in the House and Senate); and Pennsylvania, PA. CONST.
art. II, § 17(b) (requiring a five-member commission, one member each chosen by the majority
and minority leaders in both the House and Senate, and the final member to be chosen by
consensus of the other members).
44. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3, at 1817; Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh
Redistricting Paradigm Emerges in New Jersey, 1 ELECTION L.J. 1 (2002) (arguing that politician commissions force cooperation among politically motivated members).
45. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3 at 1817; Hirsch, supra note 44. Both argue that politician
commissions can be contained by good design. However, it is important to note that poor
design will lead to the same problems as states that rely solely on the legislature for
redistricting.
46. Both Alaska and Montana have commissions, ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8; MONT.
CONST. art. V, § 14, but these only have an impact on the state level since neither state currently
has more than one federal congressional district. Kristin D. Burnett, Congressional
Apportionment: 2010 Census Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2011) https://www
.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT43-QJZQ]. The other
four states are Arizona, ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)–(8); California, CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 8252 (West Supp. 2016); Idaho, IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2); and Washington, WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 43(2).
47. Cain, supra note 3 at 1818–20; Robinson O. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina–
A Personal Perspective, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1301, 1327–31 (2001).
48. This is the case in Arizona, ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)–(8) (requiring the member chosen by political parties to be chosen from a pool picked by appellate judges); Idaho,
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2) (requiring majority/minority leaders and political parties to
choose a six-member panel); Montana, MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14 (requiring the members
chosen by majority/minority leaders to choose the fifth member); and Washington, WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 43(2) (same as Montana). In Alaska, two members are chosen by the governor,
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Instituting independent redistricting commissions (IRCs) has been difficult for a
number of reasons, but primarily because legislators have little incentive to delegate
their own power when keeping it has substantial political benefits. 49 Thus, the process of institutionalizing IRCs has been largely attempted by ballot initiative, 50 a
practice that has recently been approved by the Supreme Court.51 There has been
much argument over whether IRCs truly achieve the goal of drawing impartial
boundary lines.52 While the purpose of this Note is not to wade into that argument, it
seems that, on sum, IRCs have a greater likelihood of achieving impartial lines than
leaving the process entirely up to the legislature.53
III. INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Although independent commissions within the United States have undergone
scholastic scrutiny,54 little research has been done examining global practices for the
creation and maintenance of IRCs. 55 This Note seeks to bridge the gap in current
research by examining the practices employed by IRCs around the world. To facilitate the navigation of this large body of research, this Note analyzes global practices
based on factors of independence: who chooses the IRCs, what criteria determine
how members are chosen, who has the power of removal, and what powers the commissions have.56 All of these factors stem from the author’s personal research and

one each by the House and Senate presiding officers, and one by the chief justice. ALASKA
CONST. art. VI, § 8. Members are to be chosen without regard to party affiliation. Id. In
California, members are nominated by a panel of state auditors, six commissioners are chosen
by the parties, and the other eight are chosen randomly. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252.
49. For instance, the IRC in California faced serious opposition before being approved by
ballot initiative, in part due to its chief proponent being Governor Schwarzenegger, and in part
due to fears as to how it would reshape the legislature. Cain, supra note 3, at 1821–24;
Nicholas D. Mosich, Note, Judging the Three-Judge Panel: An Evaluation of California’s
Proposed Redistricting Commission, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 165 (2005).
50. This was the case in Arizona and California. Cain, supra note 3, at 1823, 1830.
51. In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the
Court held that the referendum and initiative, while not tools used at the time of the Founding,
were consistent with the principle of popular representation and power being vested with the
people. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2015).
52. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3; Steven F. Huefner, Don’t Just Make Redistricters More
Accountable to the People, Make Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37
(2010); David G. Oedel, Allen K. Lynch, Sean E. Mulholland & Neil T. Edwards, Does the
Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congressional Partisanship?, 54 VILL. L.
REV. 57 (2009); Bates, supra note 3.
53. For the debate, see, for example Cain, supra note 3; Huefner, supra note 52; Oedel et
al., supra note 52; , Bates, supra note 3.
54. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3; Huefner, supra note 52; Oedel et al., supra note 52.
55. Only a few articles providing an international perspective have been published.
Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the
Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 999 (2013)
(analyzing the benefits of Canada’s IRCs); Stephanopoulos, supra note 3 (providing an insightful, but summary, analysis of other countries’ redistricting commissions);
56. The development of these factors stemmed, in part, from useful talks with Professor
David Williams, as well as fellow students Alex Avtgis, Rafael Macia, Brittany Shelmon,
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analysis of existing global IRCs. This section will explain alternative practices
around the world and provide a brief analysis for the effectiveness of each approach.
After looking at how practices work, this Note will analyze whether these practices
might be effective for states within the United States to adopt.
The reader should note that these analysis sections contain two levels of analysis.
Some systems the author contends are inherently bad because they provide little
oversight or protection of minority interests in the districting process. Other practices
the author contends are bad for the United States, for a variety of reasons unique to
the structure and history of the nation. These assertions stem from the author’s success conditions for an independent commission: that the commission should be designed to protect minority parties and should be functionally as impartial as possible.
A. Bodies Choosing the Commission
The first factor impacting the independence of commissions is the method by
which commissioners are chosen. Typically, members are chosen in one of five
ways: by the legislature, by the executive, by the judiciary, by a combination of multiple branches, or by popular election.
1. Legislative Branch
Commissioners appointed solely by the legislative branch are chosen either in a
partisan or multipartisan manner. By allowing commissioners to be chosen in a partisan manner, I mean that a simple majority is all that is required to approve candidates. Thus, the party with control of the legislature can approve whichever
candidates it wants to sit on the commission. Currently, only Rwanda and Japan
choose commissioners in this manner. 57
Alternatively, other countries structure commissions in a bipartisan manner,
where multiple parties are represented. Countries have tried to build in requirements
for bipartisan agreement in three ways. First, as in Venezuela, bipartisan support can
be mandated through a statutory (or constitutional) supermajority requirement. 58 Second, as in Albania, the law can grant majority and minority parties equal seats on the

Ashley Lenderman, and Sam Von Ende. However, the factors and the research to support them
are solely the work of the author. Research notes are on file with the author.
57. In Rwanda, the commissioners are put forth to the Senate by the “government,” an
undefined term within the law. Law No. 31/2005 of 24/12/2005 (Rwanda), https://repositories
.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/5078/4170.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4CR-F99E]. The
Constitution establishes the Commission in Article 180. CONST. OF RWANDA art. 180. In Japan,
the Diet chooses members for a Central Election Management Council, and the Prime Minister
formally appoints them. FREE CHOICE FOUND., ELECTION SYSTEM IN JAPAN 5 (2007),
http://www.freechoice.jp/electionsystem.pdf [https://perma.cc/C25F-WY7W].
58. In Venezuela, individuals must apply or be nominated to be considered by the legislature. The legislature, while sitting in a joint session, chooses members. A two-thirds majority
is required for approval. LEY ORGÁNICA DEL SUFRAGIO Y PARTICIPACIÓN POLÍTICA art. 53
(1997), http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Venezuela/Leyes/LeySufragio.pdf [https://perma.cc
/SFU6-26QQ].
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commission but give the tiebreaker seat to the Speaker of the House.59 Finally, as in
Azerbaijan, some countries require that a certain number of seats belong to either an
independent party60 or, as in Mexico, to members deemed to be impartial by both
parties.61
These approaches would likely have varying degrees of success in the United
States. First, allowing a simple majority of the legislature to approve commissioners
does little to alleviate the fear of the political parties influencing redistricting, since
appointees can easily serve as proxies of the political party that appointed them.
While this problem may not be as severe in a country that rules the government by
party coalitions (because members appointed by different parties within a coalition
will sit on the committee), a majority party will likely control the commission due to
the incentives within the American voting system for only two parties. 62
Requiring a two-thirds vote by commissioners to approve redistricting plans is
problematic for two reasons. First, it is likely that this approach would result in legislative gridlock within the commissions due to the difficulty of obtaining a supermajority. Second, even though the process may grant the minority party more seats

59. Obviously, this system would still grant control of the committee to the majority party
in the United States. However, this system at least recognizes the need for all parties to be
represented on the Commission. This system is used in Albania, where the majority and minority parties elect two members each, and the “minority” majority parties and “minority”
minority parties each get to elect one. The final member must be approved by a majority vote
in the legislature. Thus, while in the United States it would give control of the committee to
the majority party, this problem is avoided due to the parliamentary structure of government
in Albania. ALBANIAN ELECTORAL CODE art. 14 (Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in Europe ed. &
trans., 2015), http://www.osce.org/albania/159501?download=true [https://perma.cc/R98Q
-CQ4B].
60. Azerbaijan elects its committee members in this way. The majority and minority party
each get to elect six candidates, and the independent representatives also get to choose six
seats. CENTRAL ELECTION COMM’N, REPUBLIC OF AZER., ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
AZERBAIJAN art. 24 (2003), http://www.msk.gov.az/uploads/qanunvericilik/election_code
_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCU9-TVFR].
61. In Mexico, ten members of the commission are chosen by parties. The eleventh member, the “President Councilor,” is chosen by the full legislature and must receive two-thirds
approval. Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales [LGIPE] art. 36, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 23-05-2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio
/pdf/LGIPE_130815.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VZX-ZEQK], translated in ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL OF THE FED. JUDICIARY, GENERAL LAW ON ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS AND
PROCEDURES OF MEXICO art. 36 (Mikaela Christiansson trans., 2014), http://
portales.te.gob.mx/ccje/sites/default/files/GENERAL%20LAW%20ON%20ELECTORAL%20
INSTITUTIONS%20AND%20PROCEDURES.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB3G-5DB8].
62. This conclusion rests strongly upon Duverger’s Hypothesis, which postulated that
countries with a simple majority/plurality voting system and single-member districts would
likely result in two dominant parties. While his theory has been challenged, it has largely been
validated in American politics. MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN STATE (Barbara & Robert North trans., Harper
& Row Publishers 3d ed. 1964) (1951); see also Kenneth Benoit, Duverger’s Law and the
Study of Electoral Systems, 4 FRENCH POL. 69, 76 (2006), http://www.kenbenoit.net/pdfs
/Benoit_FrenchPolitics_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE7X-2T93] (challenging Duverget’s
conclusions as a “law” but still finding some general applicability).
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on the commission, it still seems likely that the majority party will dominate the
commission and thus have the power to draw district lines in a skewed, partisan manner. Allowing the tiebreaker seat to be occupied by the Speaker of the House is a
poor solution for the same reason—the majority party can drive the agenda of the
commission.
The final option—requiring seats to be designated for an independent party or for
a person deemed impartial by both parties—is the most viable option. While designating seats to an independent party does not seem viable in most parts of America
due to the dominant two-party system,63 requiring the commissioner with the tiebreaking vote to be impartial is a good solution, since it forces the parties to agree on
an impartial member who will have the final say in disputes. In fact, this is very
similar to the approaches adopted by Arizona and Washington. 64
2. Executive Branch
When the power of choosing commissioners is delegated to the executive branch,
the process is generally carried out in one of three ways. First, a number of small
countries (Antigua and Barbuda,65 Barbados,66 Belize,67 Malta,68 Mauritius,69 St.
Kitts and Nevis,70 and Trinidad and Tobago71) require the executive to appoint commissioners in consultation with the legislature.72 Thus, while the executive is not
bound by the legislature’s recommendation, the executive is required to get its input

63. For a brief historical evolution of the American two-party system, see generally MARK
A. LAUSE, THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION IN
THE SERVICE OF POWER, PRIVILEGE AND CAPITAL (2015), http://www.solidarity-us.org
/files/The%20Two-Party%20System%20in%20the%20United%20States.pdf [https://perma
.cc/F9LZ-WA5W]. For an argument that a stable presidential system must only have two
strong parties to be effective, see Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism, Multiparty Systems, and
Democracy: The Difficult Equation (Helen Kellogg Inst. for Int’l Studies, Working Paper No.
144, 1990), https://www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/144.pdf [https://
perma.cc/97LZ-LKNU].
64. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)–(8) (requiring the fifth commissioner to be an
Independent and to be chosen by the other four commissioners); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(2)
(requiring the members chosen by majority/minority leaders to choose the fifth member).
65. CONST. OF ANT. & BARB. § 63(1).
66. CONST. OF BARB. § 41A(3).
67. CONST. OF BELIZE § 88(1)–(2).
68. CONST. OF MALTA art. 60(3).
69. CONST. OF MAURITIUS § 38(1).
70. CONST. OF ST. KITTS & NEVIS § 49(1) (St. Kitts & Nevis).
71. CONST. OF TRIN. & TOBAGO § 71(3).
72. The weight of the recommendations of the majority and minority leaders probably
vary contextually. Each of the constitutions for these countries seems to be geared at giving
these recommendations as much weight as possible. See supra notes 65–71.
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before making a decision. Second, some countries, such as the Gambia,73 Lesotho,74
Seychelles,75 the Solomon Islands,76 Swaziland,77 and Vanuatu,78 require the executive to appoint commissioners after consulting with an independent commission,
although, once again, the executive is not bound by the commission’s recommendations.79 A final option, utilized by Bangladesh, 80 Germany,81 Hong Kong,82 Sri
Lanka,83 and Tonga,84 is direct appointment, where the executive is not required to
consult with any other branch of government or independent commission. 85 While
this option may appear ripe for abuse, appointments are generally subject to other

73. In the Gambia, the executive chooses candidates on the advice of both the Judicial
Service Commission and the Public Service Commission. CONST. OF GAM. § 42(3). While the
Public Service Commission is entirely composed of candidates appointed by the executive, id.
§ 172, the Judicial Service Commission is much more balanced: its membership includes the
chief justice, a judge from a superior court, the solicitor general, a legal practitioner appointed
by the attorney general, one member appointed by the president, and one member appointed
by the National Assembly, id. § 145.
74. In Lesotho, members are recommended by the Judicial Service Commission, an advisory body of the executive that is not generally designed to be independent. CONST. OF
LESOTHO §§ 66(1), 132. This body still serves the function of recommending to the executive
a set of qualified candidates to hold these committee seats. Id. § 66(1).
75. In Seychelles, the president chooses the members of the committee on the advice of
the Constitutional Appointment Authority, a three-person body. CONST. OF SEY. art. 115.A; id.
art. 140, § 1. One member of this body is chosen by the president, and one is chosen by the
Leader of the Opposition. Id. art. 140, § 2. Together, these members are supposed to choose a
third member to sit on the committee with them. Id. Uniquely, this body then chooses seven
members, of which the president serves five to sit on the Electoral Commission. Id. art. 115.A.
76. In the Solomon Islands, members are recommended by the Judicial and Legal Service
Commission, an advisory body of the executive that is not generally designed to be independent. CONST. OF THE SOLOM IS. §§ 53(1)(a), 117. This body still serves the function of recommending to the executive a set of qualified candidates to hold these committee seats. Id.
§ 53(1)(a).
77. In Swaziland, members are recommended by the Judicial Service Commission, an
advisory body of the executive that is not generally designed to be independent. CONST. OF
SWAZ. §§ 90(2), 159(1). This body still serves the function of recommending to the executive
a set of qualified candidates to hold these committee seats. Id. § 90(2).
78. In Vanuatu, members are recommended by the Judicial Service Commission, an
executive advisory body. CONST. OF VANUATU art. 18, § 1; id. art. 48, § 1.
79. See supra notes 73–78.
80. CONST. OF BANGL. § 118, cl. 1.
81. Bundeswahlgesetz [BWG] [Federal Elections Act], July 23, 1993,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1288, as amended, § 3(2), translation at http://
aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/DE/germany-federal-elections-act-1993/at_download/file
[https://perma.cc/UJ4X-VJ7Z].
82. Electoral Affairs Commission Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 541, 2, § 3(2), http://
www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/B1CF624C2
B6AA815482575EF0016AA19/$FILE/CAP_541_e_b5.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VXA-YMEV].
83. CONST. OF SRI LANKA art. 95, para. 1.
84. Electoral Boundaries Commission Act 2010 (Act No. 15/2010) § 4(1),
http://www.tongaelections.com/images/stories/TECdocuments/ENG/ElectoralBoundariesAct
/electoralboundariescommissionact2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UY6-U7MG].
85. See supra notes 80–84.
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constitutional or statutory requirements, so while appointees may have political affiliations similar to the executive, they must at least meet certain minimum requirements. Thus, even if the commissioners have a partisan bias, they still must be
qualified.86
These options are not well suited for the United States because all of them place
too much power in the hands of the executive. In these options, the executive has
discretion to appoint commissioners that are members of his political party and stack
the commission in much the same way that a partisan legislature could. While this
may work in a country like Germany run by a coalition executive who can be voted
out by the Parliament, it is unlikely to work in a country like the United States where
the executive is not directly responsible to the people.
3. Judicial Branch
Only two countries delegate the sole power of choosing commissioners to their
judicial branches. Costa Rica requires a two-thirds majority vote from the Supreme
Court of Justice87 to approve commissioners.88 Meanwhile, Turkey’s system utilizes
both an appellate and an administrative court, with each court choosing a set number
of commissioners.89
While the idea of granting the judiciary the sole power of choosing commissioners
has some appeal, it should be rejected in the United States for three reasons. First,
even though judges are chosen to impartially apply the law, a large body of recent
social-science research indicates that judges are prone to rely heavily on their personal feelings and ideological leanings.90 This does not mean that the judiciary would
choose commissioners in a more biased manner than the legislature, but it does indicate a need for caution before delegating this task solely to the judiciary. Similarly,

86. In some countries, these qualifications limit the individuals that may be selected for
the Commission (for example, in some countries an individual must be the surveyor general
or chief statistician); other meaningful checks include requiring that the appointee is not politically involved. See infra Part III.B.
87. The Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica comprises four subcourts, including three
Cassation Courts and a Constitutional Court. The members of the court are elected for eightyear terms by the legislature. Thus, committee members are certainly not chosen by the legislature, but since the term limits of the justices are short, the legislature presumptively has some
degree of influence since they appoint the justices who appoint commissioners. For a brief
overview of the court, see DESCRIPTION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF COSTA RICA,
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/cri/en_cri-int-des
-gen.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3HJ-ZKKK].
88. Costa Rica is the only country to choose commissioners in this manner. Código
Electoral [Electoral Code], Ley No. 8765, art. 13, https://www.tse.go.cr/pdf/normativa
/codigoelectoral.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DJP-3CMU].
89. This system is utilized in Turkey. While eleven members are appointed, only seven
serve. The other four are alternates. Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter
Registration, Law No. 298, Apr. 26, 1961, as amended, art. 11 (Turk.), https://www.ecoi
.net/file_upload/1504_1220346141_law-on-basic-provisions-on-elections-and-voter-registers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H43Z-BELK].
90. See supra note 355.
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the second concern is that the public would notice the effect that the judiciary’s ideological leanings have on its decisions, a result that would compromise the public’s
perception of the impartiality of the judiciary. A final concern is judicial economy
and expertise, as many judges would not possess knowledge regarding how to draft
redistricting plans.
4. Multiple Branches
A majority of countries structure their commissions so that multiple branches
have a substantial say in choosing commissioners. Countries that involve more than
one branch in the process generally utilize a combination of approaches stemming
from six different methodological families.91
The first family of options requires the legislative and executive branches to work
together in a partisan way. Once again, “partisan” here means that there is no affirmative check on the majority party. Countries operationalize this method in three ways.
First, some countries such as Eritrea,92 Kiribati,93 Liberia,94 Sierra Leone,95
Tajikistan,96 Tanzania,97 Turkmenistan,98 Uganda,99 and Zambia100 require majority
legislative approval of candidates chosen by the executive.101 A second option, utilized by the Maldives,102 New Zealand,103 and Ukraine,104 requires the executive to

91. Once again, this framework has been created by the author simply as an analytical
tool to understand the distinctions between various countries.
92. ERITREAN ELECTORAL LAW, art. 4, http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content/uploads
/2015/07/ERITREA-ELECTION-LAWS.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q54D-LHPV].
93. In Kiribati, the executive chooses candidates after consultation with his cabinet.
CONST. OF KIRIBATI § 62(2). The decisions are laid before the legislature, but are assumed
accepted unless they are affirmatively rejected. Id. § 62(3).
94. Liberian electoral law requires the president to choose candidates “with the advice
and consent of the senate.” REPUBLIC OF LIBER., THE NEW ELECTIONS LAW s. 2.1 (2011),
http://www.necliberia.org/admin/pg_img/Election%20Law%20Incorporated%202011final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V3ZZ-L445].
95. CONST. OF SIERRA LEONE § 32(3).
96. Tajikistan requires candidates to be approved by the lower house. On Elections to the
Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dec. 10, 1999, as amended, art. 11,
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6930 [https://perma.cc/NH4T-5R4S].
97. CONST. OF TANZ. art. 74(1).
98. ELECTORAL CODE OF TURK., art. 21, http://www.legislationline.org/download/action
/download/id/5097/file/Turkmenistan_law_approval_Electoral%20Code_2013_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JJR4-WNDS].
99. CONST. OF UGANDA art. 60, cl. 1.
100. Electoral Commission Act, Cap. 17 (1996) § 4(3), http://www.parliament.gov.zm
/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Electoral%20Commission%20Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFY8
-R6F8].
101. See supra notes 92–100.
102. CONST. OF MALDIVES art. 168.
103. In New Zealand, approved candidates specifically come from the lower house.
Electoral Act 1993, s 4D.
104. LAW OF UKRAINE ON THE CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION, art. 6,
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/7148 [https://perma.cc/6PNB-5YSB].
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choose candidates from a list of nominees chosen by the legislature. 105 Finally,
Belarus106 and Zimbabwe107 allow the executive and legislative branches each to
choose a set number of commissioners.108
None of these options are good for state commissions in the United States because they can place too much power in the hands of the majority. This is especially
dangerous because it keeps the majority party in power and marginalizes competing
ideas, undermining the democratic process. While the executive could serve as a
powerful check on the legislature if the executive is from an opposing party, if the
executive is from the same party there is likely to be collusion (deliberate or not)
between the branches, and the resulting commission will likely be highly biased.
While this sort of commission might be effective when a state legislative majority
has a different party affiliation than the governor, this method fails to account for
situations where a party controls the legislative and executive branches. Thus, this
method fails to account for certain electoral outcomes and should be discarded because of the risk of biased results.
Second, some countries require the legislative and executive branches to work
together in a bipartisan manner, thus seeking to validate concerns from majority and
minority parties. This option is bipartisan because it seeks to accommodate both majority and minority parties, instead of leaving commissioner appointment solely in
the hands of the majority party. The first option, utilized only in St. Vincent, allows
both the majority and minority party (or theoretically a percentage of each party in a
country with a coalition government) to choose an equal number of commissioners,
while allowing the executive to choose the tiebreaker.109 A second method, utilized
in Dominica,110 Grenada,111 and St. Lucia,112 allows the executive to choose an equal
number of members from the majority and minority parties while granting the tiebreaker seat to the Speaker of the House. 113 A third method, utilized in Pakistan114

105. See supra notes 102–04.
106. In Belarus, six members of the commission are chosen by the president, and six are
chosen by the legislature (Council of the Republic). These individuals are recommended to
the national branches by regional committees. Electoral Code of the Republic of Belarus, No.
370-Z, Feb. 11, 2000, as amended, art. 32, http://www.sze.hu/~smuk/Nyilvanossag_torvenyek
_east_south_eur/Jogforr%C3%A1sok/V%C3%A1laszt%C3%A1si/BEL%20-%20Electoral
%20Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQV5-ZSG5].
107. In Zimbabwe, the president chooses the committee chair “after consultation with the
Judicial Service Commission” and the legislature. CONST. OF ZIM. § 238(1)(a) The other eight
members are chosen from a list proposed by the legislature. Id. at § 238(1)(b).
108. See supra notes 106–07.
109. CONST. OF ST. VINCENT § 32(1).
110. CONST. OF DOMINICA § 56(2).
111. CONST. OF GREN. § 55(1).
112. CONST. OF ST. LUCIA § 57(2).
113. See supra notes 109–12.
114. In Pakistan, the prime minister and Leader of the Opposition present a list of names
to the president; from that list, he can nominate whom he will. CONST. OF PAK., art. 213, cl. 2A
(authorizing the committee). A description of the electoral process can be found on the
Electoral Commission of Pakistan’s website. Overview of ECP, ELECTION COMM’N OF PAK.,
http://ecp.gov.pk/frmGenericPage.aspx?PageID=21 [https://perma.cc/RM9Y-L2H7].
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and Yemen,115 requires legislators from both (or all) parties to approve a list of candidates from which the executive can choose.116 A fourth method, utilized only in
Sudan117 and South Sudan,118 allows the executive to nominate commissioners subject to a two-thirds majority approval vote in the legislature.119 A final method, utilized in both Georgia120 and Guyana,121 allows the executive to choose slightly less
than half of the commissioners, while the majority and minority parties equally
choose the other commissioners.122
These global alternatives are likely to have varying degrees of success in the
United States. First, allowing majority and minority parties to choose an equal number of commissioners while delegating the tiebreaker vote to the executive seems to
do little to fix the problem of a party controlling a majority of seats on the commission. Since the governor is usually a member of the majority or minority party, one
party will still have direct control of the commission. Granting the tiebreaking vote
to the stateSpeaker of the House fails for the same reason, since it grants the majority
party unchecked control of the commission.
Allowing the executive to choose commissioners from a list approved by the legislature as a whole may have more success at balancing the interests at stake. Since
the legislature as a whole must agree on the candidates, presumably they will be more
moderate in order to receive the nomination. However, it seems likely that this will
result in the executive cherry-picking candidates identified by the legislature that are
most ideologically similar to the executive’s party. Allowing the executive to choose
candidates subject to a two-thirds approval vote in the legislature, is, in many ways,
similar to the current judicial nominations process in the United States.123 While this

115. In Yemen, the legislature must nominate fifteen members to the executive for
consideration; those fifteen must receive approval from at least two-thirds of the legislature.
GENERAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM LAW art. 19 (2001), http://publicofficialsfinancial
disclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Yemen_General%20Elections
%20and%20Referendum%20Law_2001_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KTF-AN5A].
116. See supra notes 114–15.
117. National Elections Act 2008 § 6(1) (Sudan), http://nec.org.sd/en/wp-content/uploads/sites
/2/2013/09/THE-NATIONAL-ELECTIONS-ACT-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NDW-3K9R]
(requiring approval of the vice president as well).
118. National Elections Act, 2012, § 10(1) (S. Sudan), http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content
/uploads/2015/07/ELECTION-ACT-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TAR-HA6C].
119. See supra notes 117–18.
120. In Georgia, five members are chosen by the president, while the remaining seven
members are chosen by various legislative parties. The committee chairman is nominated by
the president, subject to approval by the legislature. ORGANIC LAW OF GEORGIA: ELECTION
CODE OF GEORGIA art. 10, paras. 1–2 (2012), http://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files
/August%202012,%20Election_Code_of_Georgia_EN_-_codified.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4NY
-GPPJ].
121. In Guyana, the Leader of the Opposition nominates six candidates to the president,
one of whom is chosen as the chairman of the committee. “[A]cting in his or her deliberative
judgment,” the president chooses three more committee members, and the Leader of the
Opposition chooses the other three. CONST. OF GUY. § 161, paras. 2–3.
122. See supra notes 120–21.
123. For an explanation of the current process, see Michael L. Shenkman, Decoupling District from Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal To Put Trial Bench Confirmations on Track,
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process has generally worked for the federal judiciary, it has been widely criticized
for its political nature and the slow speed of confirmation by the legislature.124 Thus,
this option may not be efficient due to the difficulty of gaining a supermajority of
votes. Furthermore, if this process went through a legislative committee, similar to
the U.S. Senate, there would likely be delays in the nominating process, a potentially
grueling hearings process, and the potential of a delayed floor vote.125 In short,
partisanship could grind the appointments process to a halt. 126
Finally, allowing the majority and minority parties, as well as the executive, to
choose candidates is not a good option. The reason for this is that the composition of
the committee would ultimately be determined by the party affiliation of the executive, resulting in similar problems to delegating the process solely to a majority of
the legislature. Once again, the commission could be dominated by a majority group
that is not required to account for the interests of the minority party.
Third, some countries require input from the legislative and judicial branches to
staff commissions. Botswana,127 Canada,128 Honduras,129 Malawi,130 and the United

65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 248–81 (2012).
124. The death of Justice Scalia and nomination by President Obama of Chief Judge
Merrick Garland hurled this issue into the spotlight as a Republican-controlled Senate has
refused, as of yet, to hold any hearings on Garland. Joan Biskupic, Why Merrick Garland
Should Keep Hoping, CNN (Oct. 23, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/23/politics/hillaryclinton-merrick-garland-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/V562-DVUE]; Michael D. Shear,
Julie Hirschfeld Davis, & Gardiner Harris, Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (March 16, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obamasupreme-court-nominee.html [https://perma.cc/227T-ZJQV]. For a more academic perspective, see, e.g., Michael Teter, Rethinking Consent: Proposals for Reforming the Judicial Confirmation Process, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 287 (2012); Carl Tobias, Filling the Judicial Vacancies
in a Presidential Election Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 985 (2012).
125. Shenkman, supra note 123, at 248–97.
126. For an argument that partisanship is still slowing down the confirmation process, see
Editorial, Confirm President Obama’s Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/opinion/confirm-president-obamas-judges.html [https://
perma.cc/6UXG-EFXU].
127. In Botswana, judges are appointed to serve on the committee by the Judicial Service
Commission, and the remaining members are chosen by the legislature. CONST. OF BOTS.
§ 65A(1).
128. In Canada, boundaries commission members are chosen in each province. Electoral
Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3, § 4, http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/E-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S2C2-T66J]. Therefore, in each province, the chief justice chooses one judge
to serve on the committee, and the other two are chosen by the speaker of the legislature. Id.
§§ 5–6.
129. In Honduras, the Supreme Court of Justice chooses a candidate and an alternate, as
does each registered party. CONST. OF HOND. art. 52. If there is an even number of commissioners, then the executive appoints an extra member. Id.
130. In Malawi, judges are appointed to serve on the committee by the Judicial Service
Commission, and the remaining members are chosen by the legislature. CONST. OF MALAWI
§ 75(1).
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Kingdom131 require these branches to pick a specific number of candidates, but usually the judiciary chooses the tiebreaking member.132
Requiring input from both the legislature and the judiciary may be a viable approach in the United States. While it may not be prudent to grant sole appointment
power to the judiciary,133 the same concerns are not implicated when the judiciary is
tasked with choosing one impartial member. Although the judiciary certainly is a
political branch to some extent, its concern with being perceived as impartial should
psychologically push the judiciary to choose more impartial candidates than the legislature. While judges may be influenced by their ideology when choosing candidates, this concern is minimized due to the ideally neutral goal of their choice—a
commissioner who can fairly facilitate the redistricting process. Finally, the process
of choosing commissioners could be made fairer by requiring a supermajority of justices to approve a commissioner.
A fourth method requires the judicial and executive branches to work together
when choosing commissioners. South Africa is the only country that uses this
method, which calls for judges to sit on selection panels to nominate candidates that
the executive eventually approves.134
This method seems unlikely to succeed in the United States for two reasons. First,
there may be concerns over delegating sole nomination power to the judiciary since
it is, to some degree, political and likely to choose candidates somewhat in agreement
with its ideological leanings.135 However, even if this concern were alleviated, there
would still be cause for concern if the executive or the legislature had the sole power
of choosing candidates.
A fifth method, utilized in Kenya 136 and Namibia,137 requires the executive and
legislative branches to work in concert with an independent selection commission to

131. The situation in the United Kingdom is similar to the one in Canada. The Speaker of
the House serves as the chair of each of the four committees. The deputy chair is a judge of
the high court of that region. Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, c. 56, sch. 1,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/56/pdfs/ukpga_19860056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4ZE9-HNY6]. The other two members are chosen by the secretary of state. Id.
132. See supra notes 127–31.
133. See supra Part III.A.3.
134. In South Africa, the selection panel must include a member of the Constitutional
Court, a judge designated by the chief justice, one member of the Commission for Gender
Equality, two persons with specific knowledge of boundary demarcation, and the chair of the
Select Committee of the National Council of Provinces. Local Government: Municipal
Demarcation Act 27 of 1998 § 8(1), http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/a27-98.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WAR-8GZY].
135. See supra Part III.A.3.
136. In Kenya, the Selection Commission consists of two persons (one male and one female) nominated by the president, two persons (one male and one female) nominated by the
prime minister, one member from the Judicial Service Commission, one member from
Kenya’s Anti-Corruption Advisory Board, and one person from the Association of
Professional Societies of East Africa. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act
(Act No. 9/2011), as amended, sched. 1, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts
/IndependentElectoralandBoundariesCommissionNo9of2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/P468-Z454].
137. In Namibia, the Selection Commission must include the Chairperson of the Public
Service Commission, the Chairperson of the Council of the Law Society of Namibia, the
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choose commissioners for the IRC. In these countries, a selection committee nominates a set number of candidates, from which the executive appoints commissioners.
The legislature then votes on approval of these candidates. 138
With slight modifications, this system may work in the United States. Operationalizing a selection commission may be difficult; however, it is possible that a commission could be composed of electoral and statistical experts. Bias could be minimized because the executive and legislative branches would have to approve the
candidates. Finally, it would be important to require a supermajority of votes from a
selection commission to nominate commissioners in order to avoid partisan appointments by a simple majority of commissioners.
The sixth option requires all three branches of government working together to
approve nominees. This is accomplished in two ways. First, in the Bahamas139 and
Puerto Rico,140 members of (or appointees from) the legislative, executive, and judicial branches sit on a commission.141 Second, in Bhutan142 and Thailand,143 members
of the legislative and judicial branches sit on a selection commission, and the executive must ratify their nominations. 144
Either option may work in the United States. The first option has potential if members are chosen equally from majority and minority parties with a judge serving as
the tiebreaker. However, partisanship could easily slip in because the executive
would likely choose a judge that shares his or her ideology. While this would require

Chairman of the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board, the Registrar of the High Court,
and the Director of the Namibian Qualifications Authority. The law also provides for alternates. Electoral Act, 2014 (Act No. 5/2014), §6, http://www.ecn.na/documents/27857
/193258/Electoral+Act+5+of+2014.pdf/1bd1c3e3-bdd1-4183-a2fa-2ae6e397180e [https://
perma.cc/HU3N-NMSK].
138. See supra notes 136–37.
139. In the Bahamas, the Speaker of the House serves as the chair of the commission. The
other committee members include a justice (chosen by the governor-general and the chief justice), two members of the majority party, and one member of the opposition (chosen by the
governor-general in consultation with the prime minister and leader of the opposition, respectively). CONST. OF BAH. art. 69, para. 2.
140. In Puerto Rico, the chief justice always serves as the chair of the Commission, while
the governor and senate choose the other two members, who cannot be from the same party.
P.R. CONST. art. III, § 4.
141. See supra notes 139–40.
142. In Bhutan, a Selection Commission consisting of the prime minister, chief justice,
Speaker, Chairperson of the National Council, and Leader of the Opposition nominates members to the executive. The executive then must appoint three nominees. ELECTION ACT OF THE
KINGDOM OF BHUTAN, 2008, § 22 (2008), http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure
.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Bhutan_Election%20Act_2008_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88Z8-EBHW].
143. In Thailand, under the 2007 constitution (superseded by an interim constitution in
2014 and a new constitution in 2016), the Selection Commission contains the president of the
Constitutional Court, the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, the president of the
Supreme Administrative Court, the president of the House of Representatives, the opposition
leader of the House, and a member appointed by a committee from the Supreme
Administrative Court. These nominees must then be approved by the executive. CONST. OF
THAI. (2007) § 231(1).
144. See supra notes 142–43.
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participation from all branches of government and may create a good tiebreaker, the
degree of executive control shadows this proposition.
Requiring members of the legislature and the judiciary to select candidates subject
to executive approval would once again fail to build in protection for minority parties. Even if members of the judiciary were functionally neutral, there would still be
a high probability that the executive would choose nominees that align with his or
her predilections.
A third option, not currently utilized by any country, would require judges of the
highest court to serve as a selection commission, with the ability to nominate candidates by a two-thirds majority. The executive would then be required to officially
nominate candidates from this list, subject to final legislative approval. Two potential
problems here would be gridlock in the legislature if a supermajority of votes is required for confirmation and potential concerns of overburdening the judiciary.
5. Popular Elections
A final alternative for choosing commissioners is electing them by popular vote.
Currently, this method is utilized only in the Virgin Islands. 145 Despite how appealing
the citizenry would find popular election of commissions, this solution is untenable
for two reasons. First, since the concept of gerrymandering and the need for an independent commission is a subject the population is generally uninformed about, commissioners would likely be chosen based on popularity instead of impartiality. The
second reason directly connects to the first—if commissioners are generally chosen
based on popularity and party affiliation, the commission will likely face the same
problems presented by one party controlling a majority of the seats on the commission. Thus, popular election seems like it would only work in situations where the
public is well informed about the need for a commission and understands the need
for commissioners to represent different ideologies, perhaps disparate from the citizens’ perspectives.
B. Commissioner Requirements
Various requirements placed on the composition of the committee as a whole, and
on individual commissioners, also contribute to the independence of commissions.
These factors include the number of sitting commissioners, the political (or apolitical) nature of commissioners, the creation of specialized positions on the commission, and educational or experiential requirements for membership.
1. Number of Commissioners
Three approaches are used by countries for establishing the number of commissioners. The first approach, utilized by the vast majority of countries, requires commissions to always have a set number of commissioners.146 The second approach,

145. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 41, 47 (1998 & Supp. 2016).
146. The vast majority of countries elect this route. For the sake of example, I will only list
six countries, but there are many more. CONST. OF GUY. § 161; CONST. OF UGANDA, art. 60,
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utilized by Kiribati,147 Mauritius,148 Trinidad,149 and Zambia,150 requires the appointing body to discretionarily appoint a number of members within a possible range. 151
The final approach, used in Malawi 152 and Malta,153 requires a minimum number of
commissioners, but creates no maximum number. 154
Of these options, requiring a set number of commissioners is the only viable option in the United States because the other two options are ripe for abuse. The latter
two options allow the appointing groups to choose the number of commissioners—
effectively allowing them to pack the commission. Having an uncapped number of
commissioners is particularly dangerous because it would allow the appointing body
to add members to the commission and skew its political composition.
Whether the commission should have an even or odd number of commissioners
is also significant.155 While in many countries this analysis is complicated by the
number of parties, in the United States the analysis is simpler due to the prevalence

cl. 1; CENTRAL ELECTION COMM’N, REPUBLIC OF AZER., ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
AZERBAIJAN art. 24 (2003), http://www.msk.gov.az/uploads/qanunvericilik/election_code_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z2X3-GW9C]; ERITREAN ELECTORAL LAW, art. 4, http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil
/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ERITREA-ELECTION-LAWS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7UQ
-3G22]; Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections (Act No. 3/1997),
as amended, § 26 (Papua N.G.), http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/pacific/PG/papua-new
-guinea-1997-organic-law-on-national-and/at_download/file [https://perma.cc/7HKC-YR24];
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, c. 56, sch. 1 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1986/56/pdfs/ukpga_19860056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV7G-FRB4].
147. CONST. OF KIRIBATI § 62(1) (requiring a minimum of three and a maximum of five
commissioners).
148. CONST. OF MAURITIUS § 38(1) (requiring a minimum of three and a maximum of eight
commissioners).
149. CONST. OF TRIN. & TOBAGO § 71(2) (requiring a minimum of three and a maximum
of five commissioners).
150. Electoral Commission Act, Cap. 17 (1996) § 4(2), http://www.parliament.gov.zm
/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Electoral%20Commission%20Act.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9WDW-FQJG](allowing a maximum of five commissioners).
151. See supra notes 147–50.
152. CONST. OF MALAWI § 75(1) (requiring a minimum of seven commissioners).
153. CONST. OF MALTA art. 60(2) (requiring a minimum of five commissioners).
154. See supra notes 152–53.
155. There are many examples of commissions with odd and even numbered constituencies. For a few examples of odd numbered commissions, see CONST. OF GUY. § 161; CONST.
OF UGANDA, art. 60, cl. 1; and ERITREAN ELECTORAL LAW, art. 4, http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil
/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ERITREA-ELECTION-LAWS.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJP2-654A].
For a few examples of even numbered commissions, see CENTRAL ELECTION COMM’N,
REPUBLIC OF AZER., ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN art. 24.1 (2003),
http://www.msk.gov.az/uploads/qanunvericilik/election_code_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY8H
-XD8P] (requiring roughly a two-thirds majority vote to approve decrees of the commission);
Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections (Act No. 3/1997), as
amended, § 26 (Papua N.G.), http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/pacific/PG/papua-new
-guinea-1997-organic-law-on-national-and/at_download/file [https://perma.cc/SK6W-T953];
and Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, c. 56, sch. 1 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1986/56/pdfs/ukpga_19860056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3LM-XLQW].
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of only two major parties.156 A system designed with an odd number of commissioners is useful for efficiency reasons, but it also raises questions concerning who should
have the deciding vote. Even-numbered commissions, on the other hand, allow for
equal representation of majority and minority parties, and ideally this composition
forces members to compromise. However, gridlock is also a possibility, which could
undermine the commission’s work. Neither of these practices is inherently better than
the other; however, an odd-numbered commission with the most impartial tiebreaker
possible is likely the most efficient option. The current frustration at gridlock within
the American system is likely to discourage designers from utilizing a commission
with an even number of members.157
2. Political Nature of Commissioners
In Georgia,158 Namibia,159 Seychelles,160 Sri Lanka,161 and Sudan,162 commissioners are required to be “nonpartisan,” or to have no major involvement in a political
party for a period of time prior to serving on a commission.163 Other countries, such
as Barbados,164 Canada,165 and Dominica,166 place no serious restrictions on the political affiliation of members; rather, they seek to balance the number of seats designated to appointees of majority and minority parties.167

156. See LAUSE, supra note 63.
157. Although gridlock was part of the American system when adopted (and deliberately
so), in recent years there has been severe backlash at the gridlock within government. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); Danna Morgan Seligman, The Origins of Political
Gridlock in the United States: Modeling Institutional Gridlock as Moral Hazard in the United
States Congress (May 2, 2014) (unpublished undergraduate thesis, Stanford University) (on
file with Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law, Stanford University).
158. ORGANIC LAW OF GEORGIA: ELECTION CODE OF GEOR. art. 12, para. 4 (2012), http://
www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/August%202012,%20Election_Code_of_Georgia_EN_
-_codified.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6KX-EKHP].
159. Electoral Act, 2014 (Act No. 5/2014), § 7(1)(b)(ii), http://www.ecn.na/documents
/27857/193258/Electoral+Act+5+of+2014.pdf/1bd1c3e3-bdd1-4183-a2fa-2ae6e397180e [https://
perma.cc/249D-62RG] (requiring a commissioner to not be an “active politician”).
160. CONST. OF SEY. art. 115.B (requiring candidates to not be holding office within a
political party).
161. CONST. OF SRI LANKA art. 95, para. 1 (allowing the president to appoint anyone that
he is convinced is not political).
162. National Elections Act 2008 § 6(2), http://nec.org.sd/en/wp-content/uploads
/sites/2/2013/09/THE-NATIONAL-ELECTIONS-ACT-2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R3AA
-ATLT] (stating candidates must be “independent, competent, non-partisan and impartial”).
163. See supra notes 158–62.
164. CONST. OF BARB. § 41A.
165. Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3, §§ 6, 10, http://laws
.justice.gc.ca/PDF/E-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR73-56TU].
166. CONST. OF DOMINICA § 56(4).
167. A large number of countries place no restriction on political affiliation of candidates
(except that they cannot hold or run for political office while a commissioner). For a few
examples, see supra notes 164–66.
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While both of these approaches could be effective in the United States, limiting
political affiliation for all commission members seems to be an unlikely outcome.
Americans tend to be highly political, particularly amongst those with the qualifications to be in the public service.168 Limiting an individual’s ability to have political
affiliations would make it difficult to find qualified, competent individuals to serve
on the independent commissions.169 Rather, allowing commissioners to maintain
party affiliations in a balanced manner would best facilitate the work of IRCs. Thus,
instead of trying to ignore the political leanings of commissioners, we would seek to
use them to give the commission more perspective. For instance, if a commission is
composed of an even number of commissioners, one-half each could come from the
majority and minority parties. However, if a commission requires an odd number of
commissioners, a tiebreaker seat may be delegated either to an individual with no
party affiliation or an individual deemed by the other members of the commission to
be impartial.170 This decreases the administrative concerns of requiring all commissioners to be impartial but still honors the role of an impartial arbiter helping to guide
the competing interests of political parties.
3. Specialized Positions
Another method of limiting who can sit on the commissions requires an individual
to obtain special qualifications before sitting on the commission. While countries
require many different specialized requirements to hold office, three may be of particular interest for the United States. These qualifications include either requiring one

168. Avi Tuschman, Why Americans Are So Polarized: Education and Evolution, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/why
-americans-are-so-polarized-education-and-evolution/284098/ [https://perma.cc/9QRN-B2M3]
(arguing that Americans are polarized due to the community groups they sort themselves into).
169. It is unclear whether this would also raise First Amendment concerns. Generally, restrictions upon political speech are highly suspect. While it seems likely that political speech
could not be regulated, the case of Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), may
indicate this could be permissible. In Williams-Yulee, the Supreme Court deemed that certain
content-based restrictions upon candidates running for judicial office were justified because
the government had a compelling interest in the independence of the judiciary and the restrictions were narrowly tailored. Id. at 1658–60. While it could be argued that there is a “compelling interest” in the independence of an IRC commissioner, it seems likely that not allowing
any political affiliation could potentially not be a narrowly tailored restriction. This sort of
restriction would certainly raise a complex and novel First Amendment concern.
170. This is the way that the process is done in Arizona’s IRC. Frequently Asked Questions,
ARIZ. INDEP. REDISTRICTING COMMISSION (2011), http://azredistricting.org/About-IRC/FAQ.asp
[https://perma.cc/Y8HR-X6TW].
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commissioner to be the head statistician,171 one to be the surveyor general,172 or one
to be a current or former judge.173
Requiring the tiebreaker commissioner in the United States to hold one of these
offices might be particularly useful because, in the case of the surveyor general and
head statistician, these people are experts at parts of the redistricting process. A judge
might be beneficial for the perception of neutrality that he or she would bring to the
position. However, such an approach fails to account for the inherent biases these
individuals would bring to the commission. Nevertheless, these biases may be
slightly less pronounced than others—since these officeholders are technical experts,
they may be more prone to see districting as part of their job rather than an opportunity for partisan advancement. Due to their inherent bias, it seems these officials
would only be slightly less biased than other commissioners, and thus they are probably not the best solution.

171. In the United States, the head statistician is responsible for providing coordination,
guidance, and oversight for U.S. federal statistical agencies. KATHERINE K. WALLMAN, U.S.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ENSURING THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION UPON WHICH PUBLIC
POLICY IS BASED, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-wallman
.pdf [https://perma.cc/97UM-YV3R]. Essentially, this individual is a statistical expert. This
would be useful for an IRC because a statistician would have useful skills for making sure
districts are equally populated. Countries requiring the head statistician to serve as a commissioner include Germany, Bundeswahlgesetz [BWG] [Federal Elections Act], July 23, 1993,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1288, as amended, § 3(2) (requiring the president of
the Federal Statistical Office to serve), translation at http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions
/europe/DE/germany-federal-elections-act-1993/at_download/file [https://perma.cc/UJ4X-VJ7Z];
Papua New Guinea, Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections (Act
No. 3/1997), as amended, § 26(1)(c) (Papua N.G.), http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions
/pacific/PG/papua-new-guinea-1997-organic-law-on-national-and/at_download/file [https://perma.cc
/VV7X-ALUY]; and Tonga, Electoral Boundaries Commission Act 2010 (Act No. 15/2010)
§ 4(1)(b), http://www.tongaelections.com/images/stories/TECdocuments/ENG/Electoral
BoundariesAct/electoralboundariescommissionact2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y265-MHRT]
(requiring a “person with skill and experience as a statistician”).
172. A surveyor general is responsible for mapping boundaries and, particularly, laying
out city sites. Requiring an individual holding this office to sit on the commission would be
useful because they are used to drawing local boundaries and would understand logical cutoff
points. Countries requiring the surveyor general to serve as a commissioner include Australia,
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 60(2)(c); Papua New Guinea, Organic Law on
National and Local-Level Government Elections § 26(1)(b); and Tonga, Electoral Boundaries
Commission Act § 4(1)(c) (requiring a “qualified surveyor”).
173. Many countries require a judge to serve as a commissioner. A few of these include
the Bahamas, CONST. OF BAH. art. 69, para. 2(b); Germany, Federal Elections Act § 3(2), (requiring a judge from the Federal Administrative Court to be a commissioner); Ireland,
Electoral Act, 1997 (Act No. 25/1997) § 7(a), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1997
/act/25/enacted/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/8LHV-32FP] (requiring a judge of the Supreme Court
or the High Court); Puerto Rico, P.R. CONST. art. III, § 4 (requiring the chief justice to serve);
Tanzania, CONST. OF TANZ. art. 74(1)(a) (requiring a judge of the High Court or a justice of
the Court of Appeals to serve); and Tonga, Electoral Boundaries Commission Act § 4(1)(a)
(requiring a “person who holds or has held judicial office”).
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4. Educational and Experiential Requirements
Finally, most countries place educational and experiential requirements on commissioners. Generally, commissioners are required to either specifically hold a degree in law or are more generally allowed to hold any bachelor’s degree. 174 Experiential requirements are slightly more varied, as some countries require as little as
three years of any work experience,175 while others demand “experience organizing
and holding elections and referendums”176 or experience in management, finance,
governance, public administration, or law. 177
As a general rule, educational and experiential requirements are likely to have a
positive effect on the process of choosing commissioners. While the presence of unnecessarily burdensome requirements could prohibit qualified candidates from serving, requiring advanced education and a range of possible work experiences will ensure commissions have members with seasoned and varied perspectives that will aid
in the difficult process of redistricting.
C. Removal of Commissioners
Another significant factor impacting the independence of a commission is what
body may remove a commissioner and for what reasons. Two methods of removal
are common: commissioners are either removed by the appointing branch on the recommendation of a tribunal or directly by the appointing branch. This section will
examine the reasons for removal and then the removal methods.

174. A few examples of these countries include Armenia, ELECTORAL CODE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 40, pt. 2 (2011), http://res.elections.am/images/doc/_ecode.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8946-2F2S] (requiring at least one of the members to have “legal education
or a scientific degree in law”); Belarus, Electoral Code of the Republic of Belr., No. 370-Z,
Feb. 11, 2000, as amended, art. 32, http://www.sze.hu/~smuk/Nyilvanossag_torvenyek_east
_south_eur/Jogforr%C3%A1sok/V%C3%A1laszt%C3%A1si/BEL%20-%20Electoral%20Code
.pdf [https://perma.cc/866P-7KDP] (requiring “higher juridical education and experience”);
the Maldives, CONST. OF MALDIVES art. 169 (requiring commissioners to “possess the educational qualifications . . . necessary to discharge the functions of the Elections Commission”);
Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales [LGIPE] art. 36, para. 1(d), Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 23-05-2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx
/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_130815.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CFG-ZTNB] (requiring candidates
to have held a bachelor’s degree for five years prior to appointment), translated in ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL OF THE FED. JUDICIARY, supra note 611; and Thailand, CONST. OF THAI. (2007)
§ 230(2) (requiring at least a bachelor’s degree).
175. E.g., ORGANIC LAW OF GEOR.: ELECTION CODE OF GEOR. art. 12, para. 4 (2012),
http://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/August%202012,%20Election_Code_of_Geor
gia_EN_-_codified.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW56-JUW4].
176. Electoral Code of the Republic of Belr. art. 32.
177. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act (Act No. 9/2011), as
amended, § 6(2)(c), http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/IndependentElector
alandBoundariesCommissionNo9of2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN99-SV4V] (allowing members who hold any of these qualifications in Kenya).
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1. Removal Causes
Currently, three major reasons exist to remove commissioners from office: a
standard of misconduct (generally undefined by the enabling statutory or constitutional language),178 inability to discharge duties as a commissioner,179 and absenteeism from commission meetings.180
In the United States, one main concern should be preventing arbitrary application
of the standards for misconduct. Accordingly, those standards must be well defined
and guilt must be subject to the findings of a tribunal. For example, there should be
concrete examples of misconduct embedded within the law defining what actions
constitute misconduct. Removal standards provide an important check on commissioners: they ensure that commissioners do their job and maintain a healthy respect
for their position and for the law. However, removal standards must be concrete and
coupled with a procedurally sound mechanism for removal, or the commission could
easily be cowed by an aggressive legislature.
2. Removal by Tribunal
Before allowing the appointing branch to remove a commissioner, many countries
require a tribunal to find that the commissioner should be removed. Countries utilize
three different types of panels to achieve this function. First, Armenia, 181

178. There are obvious concerns over the generalized nature of the misconduct standard.
While in one sense it is useful as a catch-all category (as opposed to defining each crime that
could lead to removal), it could easily lead to commissioners being dismissed for petty crimes.
Example countries with a misconduct standard include Antigua & Barbuda, CONST. OF ANT.
& BARB. § 63(5); Kenya, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act § 10(8)(b)
(referring to removal of the committee secretary); Liberia, REPUBLIC OF LIBER., THE NEW
ELECTIONS LAW s. 2.2 (2011), http://www.necliberia.org/admin/pg_img/Election%20Law
%20Incorporated%202011final.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7CE-V3ME]; New Zealand, Electoral
Act 1993, s 4G, (allowing removal for “just cause”); and Uganda, CONST. OF UGANDA art. 60,
cl. 8, para. b.
179. Example countries include Dominica, CONST. OF DOMINICA § 56(6); Lesotho, CONST.
OF LESOTHO § 66(4); Malta, CONST. OF MALTA art. 60(7); Tonga, Electoral Boundaries
Commission Act 2010 (Act No. 15/2010) § 4(1)(c)(ii), http://www.tongaelections.com
/images/stories/TECdocuments/ENG/ElectoralBoundariesAct/electoralboundariescommissio
nact2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D827-RG4Y]; Ukraine, LAW OF UKR. ON THE CENTRAL
ELECTION COMMISSION art. 30, § 4(9), http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action
/popup/id/7148 [https://perma.cc/6PNB-5YSB]; and Zambia, Electoral Commission Act, Cap.
17 (1996) § 5(3)(a), http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Electoral
%20Commission%20Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KS6-8DRJ].
180. Countries including this requirement are Albania, ALBANIAN ELECTORAL CODE art. 18
(Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in Europe ed. & trans., 2015), http://www.osce.org/albania
/159501?download=true [https://perma.cc/D3AM-4T84]; Sudan, National Elections Act 2008
§ 8(1)(a), http://nec.org.sd/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/09/THE-NATIONAL-ELECTIONS
-ACT-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/BAF2-XWET]; and South Sudan, National Elections Act,
2012, § 12(1)(a), http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ELECTION-ACT
-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV2N-LDBX].
181. ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 43, pt. 5 (2011), http://res.elections
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Dominica,182 the Gambia,183 Sudan,184 and Yemen185 require that a panel of judges
determine whether a commissioner should continue sitting. 186 A second type of tribunal, used in Belize,187 Malawi,188 and Namibia,189 is composed of the initial candidate selection commission.190 Third, Armenia,191 Bosnia and Herzegovina,192 and
South Sudan193 require the other commissioners to recommend that their fellow commissioner be removed.194
In the United States, requiring a panel of state judges (perhaps from the state’s
highest court) to rule on commissioner competence or conduct is an appropriate forum because judges are already qualified to rule on judicial matters. 195 The idea of a
selection commission seems less likely to work, unless a well-established, permanent
selection commission is in place to hear these complaints. The main concern is that
reconvening the selection commission may be quite difficult, especially if judges,
legislators, or other government officials staffed the selection commission. Requiring
other commissioners to remove their compatriots may be efficient, but there are two
potential issues. The first concern is that opposing commissioners may try to get each
other booted off the commission; however, this concern could likely be mitigated by
requiring a supermajority of commissioners for removal. The second concern is that
commissioners will be reticent to remove their compatriots, either because they are

.am/images/doc/_ecode.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8NL-QG8T] (allowing termination by the
Administrative Court).
182. CONST. OF DOMINICA § 56(7)–(8) (allowing removal by president after a tribunal appointed by the chief justice has determined this is the proper course of action).
183. CONST. OF GAM. § 42(6) (requiring a tribunal of superior-court judges to find guilt).
184. National Elections Act of 2008 § 8(2) (requiring commissioners to appoint judges to
serve on the tribunal).
185. GENERAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM LAW art. 22, cl. c (2001), http://
publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Yemen_General
%20Elections%20and%20Referendum%20Law_2001_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/978Z-5CG4]
(allowing removal by executive after an “irrevocable court order” is given).
186. See supra notes 181–85.
187. CONST. OF BELIZE § 88(7)–(8).
188. CONST. OF MALAWI § 75(4).
189. Electoral Act, 2014 (Act No. 5/2014), § 11(4)–(5), http://www.ecn.na/documents
/27857/193258/Electoral+Act+5+of+2014.pdf/1bd1c3e3-bdd1-4183-a2fa-2ae6e397180e [https://
perma.cc/5842-KNHM] (requiring the Selection Committee to investigate, followed by removal on the order of the executive with the approval of the National Assembly).
190. See supra notes 187–89.
191. ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 43, pt. 3 (2011),
http://res.elections.am/images/doc/_ecode.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8NL-QG8T] (allowing termination by a two-thirds vote of fellow commissioners).
192. ELECTION LAW OF BOSN. AND HERZ. art. 2.5 (2002), http://www.constitutionnet.org
/files/BiH%20Election%20Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4T5-7PM5] (requiring the committee
to notify the legislature for removal).
193. National Elections Act, 2012, § 12(2), http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content/uploads
/2015/07/ELECTION-ACT-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/K77B-PZVT] (allowing
removal upon recommendation of two-thirds of the commissioners).
194. See supra notes 191–93.
195. It doesn’t really matter what level of court hears these issues, although perhaps for the
purposes of judicial authority a higher-level court would make more sense.
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friends or because they fear the damage that removal could do to the perception of
the commission.196
3. Direct Removal
The alternate option is allowing the appointing branch or branches to directly remove commissioners. This occurs in four permutations. In Sri Lanka, 197 Tonga,198
and Zimbabwe,199 the executive branch has the sole power of removal. 200 In
Albania201 and Tajikistan,202 the legislative branch has this power.203 The executive
and legislative branches are required to work together in Malta 204 and St. Kitts and
Nevis205 to remove commissioners.206 Finally, in Thailand, the legislative and judicial branches are required to work in concert to remove commissioners. 207 The biggest problem is that the provisions enabling direct removal are often vague and thus
could grant the appointing body significant discretion in removal. Without clear
standards, removal is far more likely to be arbitrary.
In the United States, most of these options do not seem consistent with the goals
of an independent commission unless the standards for removal are clear. Allowing
either the executive or legislative branches to remove members at their discretion
risks commissioners being removed for political reasons. For example, if members

196. Various concerns are implicated here, from peer pressure to favoritism. Due to these
concerns, this seems like a bad answer for the removal process.
197. CONST. OF SRI LANKA art. 95, para. 2.
198. Electoral Boundaries Commission Act 2010 (Act No. 15/2010) § 4(1)(c)(ii),
http://www.tongaelections.com/images/stories/TECdocuments/ENG/ElectoralBoundariesAct
/electoralboundariescommissionact2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JKN-FBV9].
199. CONST. OF ZIM. § 237(3) (referring to the process of removing judges, which, pursuant
to § 187(2), (4), requires the executive to appoint a panel at the discretion of the executive.
The only limitation on the panel members is that one members must be a former judge.)
200. See supra notes 196–99.
201. ALBANIAN ELECTORAL CODE art. 18(2) (Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in Europe ed. &
trans., 2015), http://www.osce.org/albania/159501?download=true [https://perma.cc/G3UW
-A2BQ] (requiring a motion by the Central Election Commission and then legislative
approval).
202. On Elections to the Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dec. 10, 1999, as
amended, art. 18, http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6930 [https://
perma.cc/H849-ZAFP] (allowing removal by the organ that chose them—the legislature).
203. See supra notes 201–02.
204. CONST. OF MALTA art. 60(6) (The Maltese Constitution provides that “a member of
the Electoral Commission may be removed from office by the President acting in accordance
with the advice of the Prime Minister.” While the prime minister could accurately be considered an executive (along with the president), the prime minister is also the head of the legislative branch. In that sense, this provision is akin to granting advisory power to the Speaker of
the House or president of the senate. Thus, the executive must weigh in, as must the prime
minister, who is the de facto representative of the legislative branch).
205. CONST. OF ST. KITTS & NEVIS § 49(2)(d) (St. Kitts & Nevis).
206. See supra notes 204–05.
207. The only example of this sort of removal is Thailand. CONST. OF THAI. (2007) § 233
(requiring one-tenth of the members of the legislature to call for removal, prompting an investigation by the Constitutional Court).
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of the commission made decisions that hurt the party with a majority in the legislature, that party could vote to remove the commissioner. This could potentially poison
the decisions of the commissioners, since removal would effectively be a veto on
commission decisions. While requiring the executive and legislative branches to
work together in removal might mitigate this if the executive and the majority of the
legislature are from different parties, there is no check if they are from the same
party. As mentioned before, this concern could be mitigated by clear standards, requiring the appointing parties to go through well-defined procedures before removing commissioners.
Requiring the judiciary and legislature to work together to remove commissioners
seems to be a viable option when used in conjunction with concrete removal standards. This approach allows the judiciary, a branch whose goal is objectivity, to work
together with one of the political branches. In effect, this method of removal could
function similarly to removal through a tribunal: the judiciary could determine
whether a violation of the law occurred, and the legislature could remove an offending commissioner.
D. Powers of the Commission
Independent commissions around the world can serve two functions. Some commissions issue binding decrees, while others issue nonbinding recommendations,
subject to the approval of the legislature.
1. Binding Decrees
In some countries, such as Armenia,208 Lesotho,209 Thailand,210 and Turkey, 211
commissions issue binding decrees, subject to no explicit appeals process.212 Yet,
other countries, including Kenya, 213 Malawi,214 Palau,215 South Sudan,216 and

208. ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 36, pt. 2 (2011), http://res.elections
.am/images/doc/_ecode.pdf [https://perma.cc/E86U-N7SU] (making all acts within the scope
of the commission’s power binding).
209. CONST. OF LESOTHO § 67(4) (making all acts of the commission binding upon the
dissolution of the legislature).
210. CONST. OF THAI. (2007) § 236.
211. Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registration, Law No. 298, Apr. 26,
1961, as amended, art. 13, https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1504_1220346141_law-on-basic
-provisions-on-elections-and-voter-registers.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YUZ-584J].
212. In all countries, matters can at least theoretically be appealed if the committee acts
contrary to its mandate. For example countries, see supra notes 208–11.
213. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act (Act No. 9/2011), as
amended, sched. 5, §§ 4–5, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/Independent
ElectoralandBoundariesCommissionNo9of2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3HU-XB72] (requiring appeals to the High Court to be made within thirty days).
214. CONST. OF MALAWI § 76(3).
215. CONST. OF PALAU art. IX, § 4(c) (allowing appeal by the Supreme Court).
216. National Elections Act, 2012, § 43, http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content/uploads
/2015/07/ELECTION-ACT-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP7E-APLD] (allowing
appeal within fourteen days to the High Court).
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Uganda,217 allow for the commission’s decisions to be challenged in the nation’s
highest court within a narrow time window before going into effect. 218 Decisions are
generally appealable by any member of the public for a districting plan that violates
the principles the commission is required by constitution or statute to follow.219
Allowing for limited judicial review of binding decisions by a commission would
be an effective way to implement commissions while still providing oversight for
partisan districting plans. If the commission is properly composed,220 the minutiae of
the redistricting plan should be impartially administered. However, courts should
have some power to review for abuse of discretion or bias in the districting plan, if
only to place a check on the power of the commission by allowing another body to
review its decisions.
2. Recommendations
Many nations grant commissions only the power to recommend redistricting
plans, subject to approval by the legislature. The majority of these nations, including
Canada,221 Kiribati,222 and Swaziland,223 require the legislature to either approve or
reject the plan in its entirety, without any modifications. 224 However, others, such as
Antigua,225 Belize,226 Grenada,227 and the United Kingdom,228 grant the legislature
the ability to modify the plan before approving it, although the legislature is supposed
to show a degree of deference to decisions by the commission. 229
Granting a commission power solely to recommend plans is beneficial because it
provides an extra layer of review before plans are put into action. This framework
acts as a check on the commission, keeping it accountable to one of the political
branches. However, this framework will only act as a meaningful check when the
commission is not merely a proxy of the majority of the legislature. If the commis-

217. CONST. OF UGANDA art. 64 (allowing appeal to the High Court).
218. See supra notes 213–17.
219. The seven factors used by the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission fairly
represent the factors generally used for redistricting: equal population, compactness, contiguousness, compliance with the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, respect for communities
of interest, incorporation of visible geographic units, and creation of competitive districts that
are not at odds with the other factors. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1700.
220. See supra Part III.A.
221. Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3, §§ 21–22,
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/E-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK93-DHUA] (allowing legislative
members opportunity to make objections and request the commission to change the report).
222. CONST. OF KIRIBATI § 63(4)–(5).
223. CONST. OF SWAZ. § 92(4) (requiring the king to examine and approve before
publication).
224. See supra notes 221–23.
225. CONST. OF ANT. & BARB. § 65.
226. CONST. OF BELIZE § 90(3)–(4).
227. CONST. OF GREN. § 56.
228. Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, c. 56, §§ 3–4, http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1986/56/pdfs/ukpga_19860056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVL6-3WG5].
229. See supra notes 225–28.
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sion is merely a proxy, then it is likely to rubberstamp the preferences of the legislature. Thus, if a commission is structured well (perhaps determined by inclusion of
members from multiple parties on the commission), then this could provide a meaningful check on the commission by requiring the plan to pass the scrutiny of legislators. However, there is a concern that if the redistricting plan hurts the interests of
the majority in the legislature, the legislature will strike down the plan for political,
self-interested motives. This concern could be mitigated by a requirement that the
legislature create a report showing any reasons for rejection if the redistricting plan
is not approved.
However, allowing the legislature to modify the commission’s plan undermines
the purpose of having an independent commission. If a majority of the legislators can
discretionarily change a plan, the redistricting process would be subject to the tyranny of the majority. In this case, the situation might be even worse because the
people would believe that the commission was in place to check the biases of the
legislature, while the legislature could still subtly alter the plan at the last moment.
CONCLUSION
Examining IRCs through an international lens provides unique and interesting alternatives to structuring redistricting commissions. Instead of the largely singlebranch approach used by many states in America, there are several multibranch
approaches available that may be more effective than current commissions. 230 Other
approaches demonstrate that the number of commissioners sitting on a commission
and the qualifications of those commissioners can play a substantial role in shaping
the expertise and accountability of the IRC’s mission.231 Additionally, they illustrate
both the need for proper and procedurally fair removal processes 232 and delegation
of powers to commissioners.233
A number of well-structured commissions both already exist and also could be
crafted from the analysis of the above factors. However, a commission that is chosen
by multiple branches with an eye toward proportional representation and an impartial, talented tiebreaking commissioner would be a good starting point for a state
considering an IRC. In some ways, this process is similar to the one established in
both Arizona and California, although modifications could be made to either based
on alternatives.234 Additionally, the commission must be made functionally independent by granting it power to issue decrees, subject solely to judicial review.

230. See supra Part III.A.
231. See supra Part III.B.
232. See supra Part III.C.
233. See supra Part III.D.
234. The commission in Arizona requires a selection commission (the State Commission
on Appellate Court Appointments) to nominate twenty-five individuals: ten Republicans, ten
Democrats, and five Independents. Of these, two Republicans and two Democrats sit on the
commission; amongst themselves they choose the fifth member, an Independent. Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 170. In California, applicants submit their information to the
Bureau of State Audits; this Bureau chooses forty Republicans, Democrats, and Independents.
Frequently Asked Questions, CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION (2014),
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/faq.html [https://perma.cc/2HWS-NYEF]. The candidates are
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An example of a five-member commission that complies with the criteria described above might look as follows. A panel of randomly assigned judges from the
state appellate and supreme courts might vet candidates from applications and recommendations from citizens of the state. The panel would recommend, by supermajority, between four and ten candidates to the governor. The governor would then
appoint two members each from the majority and minority parties, subject to approval by a majority of that candidate’s party. This process would ensure that candidates are competent, of good character, and representative of the party. 235
The final member of the commission could either be an Independent or someone
with no party affiliation. This person could either go through the same process as
other candidates, subject to a supermajority vote of approval by the whole legislature,
or could be chosen by a unanimous vote from the four commissioners sitting on the
commission. This process, identical to the one used in Arizona, ensures that the candidate will be as impartial as possible (since members of both parties must approve)
and additionally ensures that the candidate will be someone that both parties feel like
they can work with to get a plan approved. If the commissioners are unable to choose
their fifth member, then the multibranch approach mentioned above might be utilized
as a failsafe to ensure the commission will get its job done.236
Of utmost importance is that commissioners only be removed for concrete, welldefined causes that are delineated in the constitutional provision or statutes enabling
the commission. Requiring guilt to be found by a tribunal (such as the state supreme
court) would ensure that members are not removed solely for political reasons.237
Finally, it is imperative that the plans of the commission be binding, while subject
to limited judicial review in the state supreme court. This ensures that the commission can draw redistricting plans that will not be subject to legislative veto if the plans
hurt the majority party. However, this provides an appropriate and procedurally fair
forum for complaints that the redistricting plan is skewed or fundamentally unfair. 238
America stands at a pivotal point in its electoral history. The recent ruling in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission and the
success of a similar ballot initiative in California have illustrated the ability of concerned citizens to implement electoral reform that will keep the legislatures accountable and widely representative of the public, enforcing the principle of one person,
one vote.239
Independent redistricting commissions are important because they can help “restore ‘the core principle of republican government,’ namely, ‘that the voters should

reduced by that Bureau to twenty of each political affiliation. Id. Leadership of the California
State Assembly is allowed to then strike twenty-four of the applicants. Id. After this, eight
members are chosen at random to serve—three Republicans, three Democrats, and two
Independents. Id. These commissioners choose the other six members. Id.
235. See supra Part III.A.
236. See supra Part III.A.
237. See supra Part III.C.
238. See supra Part III.D.
239. See Cain, supra note 3, at 1823, 1830.
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choose their representatives, not the other way around.’” 240 As scholars and citizens
alike recognize the need for restraints on abuses of the districting process by legislators, it is essential that they find a well-established strategy for solving the problem
of gerrymanders and respond by structuring accountable, effective, and independent
commissions.

240. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677
(2015) (quoting Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 781
(2005)).

